Abstract: This paper analyzes campaign finance in a comparative perspective, giving special attention to Brazil and the Unites States. The focus regards the level of regulation on the sources of campaign contributions. Methodologically, the research design adopts a nested approach, combining descriptive and multivariate statistics with deep case studies and documental analysis. Additionally, we replicate data from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) to estimate a standardized measure of regulation. The results suggest that most countries show low levels of control over the sources of campaign contributions. However, both Brazil and the United States display high levels of regulation on campaign finance, despite their widely different institutional designs.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following situations: (1) an election where candidates provide both food and beverages (including alcoholic) for voters just before they cast their votes; (2) a public service system where jobs are assigned by political criteria and 3) an incumbent candidate is charged of receiving campaign contributions in exchange for making favors for state contractors. These cases are not about Latin American countries that are well known by lack of law enforcement. These cases are not about African nations that are worldwide acknowledged by high levels of corruption. These cases represent both the U.S. (cases 1 and 2) and Canada (case 3) before regulating their campaign finance 1 . Theoretically, campaign finance regulation aims to achieve two objectives: the promotion of political equality, and the prevention of corruption (SMITH, 2001) 2 . Arguments that favor increasing regulation are based on four assumptions: a) too much money is spent on political activity 3 ; b) campaigns funded with large contributions are not representative of public opinion but biased toward big donors; c) a candidate's spending largely determines electoral results and d) money exerts a powerful corrupting influence on the legislature.
How does campaign finance regulation varies across countries? The main purpose of paper is to analyze campaign finance regulation in a comparative perspective, giving special attention to Brazil and the United States. The focus regards the level of regulation on the sources of campaign contributions. Methodologically, the research design adopts nested analysis technique, combining descriptive and multivariate statistics with deep case studies and documental analysis (legislation and jurisprudence). In addition, we replicate data from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) to estimate a standardized measure of regulation. The results suggest that most countries show limited levels of campaign finance regulation. Nevertheless, both Brazil 1 According to Smith (2001) , in 1757, George Washington spent £39 to buy food and rum for his voters. 2 According to Ansolabehere (2007) , the primary objective of campaign finance regulations is to prevent political corruption. Limits on contributions and expenditures aim to restrict both the supply and demand for political donations, thereby reducing or perhaps eliminating altogether the influence of donors and the private interests that they represent over publicly elected officials (ANSOLABEHERE, 2007: 163) . 3 Respecting the increasing costs of elections, Ansolabehere, Gerber and Snyder (2001) point out that total expenditures in the average contested House election were $318, 000 in 1972, $735,000 in 1992, and $973,000 in 2000 (all figures in 1990 dollars) . Similarly, Jensen and Beyle (2003) argue that the costs of gubernatorial campaigns have been rising since 1968. Abrams and Settle (1976) demonstrate that the costs of presidential elections also follow this same pattern. and the United States display high levels of control over the sources of campaign contributions, despite their widely different institutional designs.
The remainder of the paper is divided as follows. Next section reviews the literature on campaign spending and election outcomes. Section 3 describes data and methods. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 examines the historical development of campaign finance legislation in Brazil and in the United States. Section 6 summarizes the main conclusions.
BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW 4
The relationship between campaign spending and electoral outcomes is a canonical issue in Political Science (PALDA, 1973 (PALDA, , 1975 WELCH, 1974 WELCH, , 1980 JACOBSON, 1976 JACOBSON, , 1978 JACOBSON, , 1985 JACOBSON, , 1990 JACOBSON, , 2001 SHEPARD, 1977; GLANTZ, ABROMOWITZ and BURKHART, 1976; ABROMOWITZ, 1988 ABROMOWITZ, , 1991 KRASNO, 1988, 1990; GERBER, 1998 GERBER, , 2004 BARDWELL, 2005) . The typical research design regarding the effects of money on votes has three main characteristics: (1) it estimates a regression of a candidate's vote share on some function of the candidate's spending levels after controlling for additional variables; (2) it uses ordinary least squares functional form 5 ; (3) the unit of analysis is the United States House of Representatives. According to Gerber (2004) , the basic model to analyze the relationship between money and votes is the following:
Votes inc = α +β 1 f(spendingi nc ) +β 2 f(spending chal ) + β 3 (X) + ε where Votes inc is the incumbent's share of the two-party vote, spending inc is the total incumbent campaign spending, spending chal is the total challenger campaign spending, and X represents a set of variables other than campaign spending that are thought to influence candidate election outcomes, such as challenger quality or constituency partisanship (GERBER, 2004) .
Some scholars examine municipal elections (FLEISCHMANN and STEIN, 1998), subnational legislative (OWENS and OLSON, 1977; GILES and PRITCHARD, 1985; TUCKER and WEBER, 1987; JEWELL and BREAUX, 1988; HUDSON, 2006; BROWN, 2009), state primaries (BREAUX and GIERZYNSKI, 1991; HOGAN, 1999) , the Senate elections (GRIER, 1989; GERBER, 1998) , gubernatorial races (PATTERSON, 1982; PARTIN, 2002; BARDWELL, 2005) and presidential nomination campaigns (HAYNES, GURIAN and NICHOLS, 1997) . On methodological grounds, some pundits employ two-stage least squares (GREEN and KRASNO, 1988) , logarithmic transformations (JACOBSON, 1978) , computational experiments (HOUSER and STRATMANN, 2008) , field experiments (Gerber and Green, 2000; Gerber, 2004) and natural experiments (MILYO, 1998) trying to properly identify the mechanisms that link spending and votes. On theoretical grounds, Gary Jacobson has produced the seminal work on campaign-spending literature 6 . Figure 1 illustrates the Jacobson`s effect. Both challengers' and incumbents' spending exert a positive effect on their share of votes and suffer from diminishing returns. However, each extra dollar spent by challengers has a higher impact 6 According to Gerber (2004) , "a common critique of Jacobson's findings was that incumbents raise their spending levels in response to strong threats. If the control variables do not fully account for the threat level, candidate spending effects will tend to be biased downward due to a negative correlation between incumbent spending and the regression error" (GERBER, 2004: 542). compared to incumbents spending 7 . Levitt (1994) argues that campaign spending has an extremely small impact on election outcomes, regardless of who does the spending (LEVITT, 1994: 777) . Gerber (1998) points out when the endogeneity of candidate spending levels is properly taken into account, the marginal effects of incumbent and challenger spending are roughly equal (GERBER, 1998: 401) . Jacobson (1990) (JACOBSON, 1978: 470) .
Nevertheless, there are controversial findings even among studies that employ two-stage least squares regression. For example, Green and Krasno (1988) reported that incumbent campaign spending coefficients' were positive and statistically significant. On the other side, Jacobson (1978) argued that spending by challengers has a much more substantial effect on the outcome of the election even with simultaneity bias purged from the equation (JACOBSON, 1978: 475) . 
; Ansolabehere e Gerber, (1994); Gerber (2004) Incumbent spending is ineffective but that challenger spending produces large gains Erikson e Palfrey (2000) ; Green e Krasno (1988) ; Gerber (1998); Levitt (1994) Neither incumbent nor challenger spending makes any appreciable difference Kenny e McBurnett (1994) ; Goidel e Gross (1994) ; Green e Krasno (1990) After controlling for quality of challenger and reciprocal causation, marginal effect of incumbent spending is substantial Krasno, Green e Cowden (1994) Incumbent spending is reactive to challenger spending 7 Normatively, campaign spending limits will favor status quo. According to Jacobson (1978) , any reform measure, which decreases spending by the candidates will favor incumbents. This includes limits on campaign contributions from individuals and groups as well as ceilings on total spending by the candidates (JACOBSON, 1978: 489) .
Despite scholarly efforts, comparative empirical work is still limited and our current understanding about campaign finance outside of the United States is scarce 8 . Thus, this paper aims to advance our existing knowledge on this subject by analyzing campaign finance regulation in a comparative perspective, giving special attention to Brazil and the United States. The focus regards the level of regulation on the sources of campaign contributions.
DATA AND METHODS
The research design adopts nested analysis approach, combining descriptive and multivariate statistics with deep case studies and documental analysis (legislation and jurisprudence). According to Lieberman (2005) , nested analysis strategy improves the prospects of making valid causal inferences in cross-national and other forms of comparative research by drawing on the distinct strengths of two important approaches (LIEBERMAN, 2005: 435) 9 . The purpose is to take the most of each research technique. Swanson (1971) argues that thinking without comparison is unthinkable. And in the absence of comparison, so is all scientific thought and scientific research (SWANSON, 1971) . Lijphart (1971) defines the comparative method as one of the basic methods -the others being the experimental, statistical, and case study methods -of establishing general empirical propositions (LIJPHART, 1971: 682 
The importance of comparison
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Besides the fundamental differences in their institutional designs (electoral system, party system and district magnitude), Brazil and the United States also differ on two important features regarding campaign finance. First, in Brazil, 9.504/97 federal law prohibits candidates and parties to buy any kind of electioneering communication (television, radio, newspapers, etc.) The amount of time available for parties and candidates depends upon the quantity of congressmen in the Legislature. Both party and candidate ads are broadcasted and the costs are paid by public resources. In the United States, candidates, Political Action Committees, parties and, independent groups can spend resources on electioneering communication 10 . Second, in Brazil, corporations can directly contribute to political candidates. In the United States, corporations contributions cannot flow directly to political campaigns, the procedure is indirect trough Political Action Committees (PACs)
11
. 10 The term electioneering communication means any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which (I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; (II) is made within 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office sought by the candidate; or 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate; and (III) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate for an office other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate ( §434(3)). 11 In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010), Supreme Court ruled that limitations on independent expenditures were unconstitutional, allowing both corporations and labor unions to spend unlimited amount of money to independently support or attack candidates.
Variables description
According to King, Keohane and Verba (1994) , the most important rule for all data collection is to report how the data were created and how we came to possess them (KING, KEOHANE and VERBA, 1994: 51) . This is the core of scientific replicability 12 . Thus, it is important to briefly describe how variables were measured. Figure 4 summarizes this information. Most countries allow contributions from foreign entities (64%). Australia, Austria, Chile, Denmark, Finland, among others, display this institutional feature. However, 41 nations show some prohibition 12 King (1995) argues that the replication standard does not actually require anyone to replicate the results of an article or book. It only requires sufficient in-formation to be provided-in the article or book or in some other publicly accessible form-so that the results could in principle be replicated (KING, 1995: 444) . 13 Raw data used here can be download at http://www.idea.int/parties/finance/db/index.cfm. A large dataset including variables used in this paper is available at http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/ regarding this type of campaign contributions (36%). Argentina, Estonia, France, Israel and Poland are examples of countries that made this institutional choice. The 9.504/97 Brazilian statute prohibits both parties and candidates to receive, directly or indirectly, contributions or anything of value, including any kind of media support, from foreign entities (24, I, 9.504/97). Similarly, according to the Federal Election Commission, it shall be unlawful for a foreign national, directly or indirectly, to make a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value, or to make an express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election 14 . It is also illegal to foreign nationals to make contributions or donations to political party committees. Finally, it is unlawful to foreign nationals make independent expenditures or disbursement for electioneering communication ( §441e). On substantive grounds, the prohibition of this type of contribution aims to prevent foreign political actors from influencing electoral outcomes. Regarding contributions from corporations, most countries allow this type of donation (81.70%). Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, among others, show this institutional feature. Only 18.30% of nations have some express prohibition on corporate campaign contributions. Portugal, Bolivia, Belgium, Hungary, among others, made this institutional choice. In Brazil, corporations can directly contribute to political campaigns up to 2% of their annual gross revenue (81, §1º, 9.504/97). If donations exceed the legal ceiling, there is a penalty of five times the amount exceeded (81, §2º, 9.504/97). In the United States, Tillman Act (1907) ban direct contributions from corporations. Current legislation makes unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any political office 15 ( § 441b). Normatively, prohibitions on corporate contributions aim to prevent disproportional influence of corporate sector on policymaking process. Following the trend of less regulation, most countries allow donations from labor unions (85.20%). Belgium, Czech Republic, Mexico, Bolivia, among others, show this institutional feature. Only 14.80% of the cases prohibit this type of campaign contributions. Guatemala, Portugal, Azerbaijan, Poland, among others, adopted this kind of ban. In Brazil, statute 9.504/97 excludes labor unions from contributing to political campaigns (24, VI, 9.504/97). In the United States, Smith-Connally Act (1943) temporarily prohibited contributions from labor unions. In 1947, Congress enacted Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) banning labor donations ever since. The current legislation includes Labor contributions in the same section of national banks and corporations ( §441b). Finally, we estimate two measures of campaign finance regulation. The first one is just the sum of all above variables. Mathematically, the index varies from 0 to 5 and its interpretation is forward: the higher its magnitude, more regulation on campaign finance system. Value zero means that all contributions are allowed. Value 5 means that all contributions are prohibited. The second measure was based on a principal component analysis (PCA). This technique summarizes shared variance of observed variables in few standardized components. The model reached the following results: a) Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test of sample adequacy of .751; b) Bartlett test of sphericity significant at .000; and c) 53.11% of cumulative variance. The Pearson correlation between the raw regulation index and the standardized measure reached .997 (p-value<.000). On substantive grounds, the strong correlation suggests that both index are measuring the same phenomena. Figure 10 summarizes descriptive statistics. States, among others). On average, the raw measure of regulation suggests that 1.36 up to five bans are adopted for most countries. The standard deviation is higher than the mean, suggesting elevated distribution spread. Figure 11 displays regulation index in selected countries.
RESULTS
Figure 11 -Standardized measure of regulation
For the standardized measure, the mean is 0 and the standard deviation is 1. As far from the mean in the positive direction, more regulation. As far from the mean on the negative direction, less regulation. While France, United States, Portugal and Argentina display maximum level of regulation, New Zealand, Saint Lucia, San Marino and Solomon Islands show a very deregulated system. Figure  12 presents a comparison between Brazil and United States bans on campaign contributions sources. 
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BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
This section examines the historical development of campaign finance in Brazil and the United States. The focus regards the level of regulation on the sources of campaign contributions on both statutes and jurisprudence.
Campaign finance in Brazil
According to Backes (2001) , despite different statues on elections, there is no legal document respecting campaign finance during Brazil Empire period (1822-1889). Regarding popular inclusion, legislation was very restrictive since it required a minimum annual income as formal criteria to allow people the right to vote 16 . Therefore, a very limited amount of people was able to participate in the electoral process. 6 National Statute (1889) ban voto censitário in Brazil but electoral participation continued limited since legislation prohibited both illiterate people and women the right to vote. During Brazilian Estado Novo (New State, 1930 -1945 , different institutional changes were adopted: 1) proportional representation for the House of Representatives; 2) creation of Electoral Justice and 3) women right to vote. Despite these innovations, Brazilian 1934 Constitution and further legislation did not addressed the financing of elections (BACKES, 2001) . In short, during two important periods of the Brazilian history --Empire and New State --there was no specific legislation regarding campaign finance.
It was during the first democratic period (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) ( § 23, 1) . In practice, this means that there is no legal ceiling since parties have discretion to set up any limit. Section 81 limits corporate contributions to 2% of donors' annual gross revenue previous to electoral year. What to say about other sources of campaign contributions? Figure 13 summarizes all prohibited sources. Panorama of Brazilian Law. Vol 2, No 2 (2014) For the purposes of this paper it is important to evaluate how Brazilian campaign finance regulation changed over time. Figure 14 summarizes this information. Contributions from foreign entities had been banned by all Brazilian campaign finance legislation. Since 1950, administrative public institutions and state contractors also were prohibited from making donations. Regarding corporations contributions, both 1965 and 1971 legislation ban it but posterior statutes make it legal. More recently, new political actors were prohibited from making campaign contributions (charitable and religious organizations, sport organizations, nongovernment organizations funded by public resources and civil society organizations). On substantive grounds, this means that regulation on campaign finance has increased over time.
Campaign finance in the United States
19
As Brazil during Empire period, the financing of elections was not a problem during the early days of American politics (CORRADO, 2005; SMITH, 2001 ). According to Corrado (2005) , in the early days of the republic, campaign funding was rarely a source of public controversy (…) since candidates usually "stood" for election without engaging in the types of personal politicking 19 The most comprehensive compilation of campaign finance regulation in the United States can be download at http://www.fec.gov/law/feca/feca.pdf or direct solicitation of votes that have come to characterize modern elections (CORRADO, 2005: 07/08). Smith (2001) points out that before the Pendleton Civil Service Act (1883) most of public offices were not elected and candidates run without opponents. Candidates use their own resources or contributions of family and friends to cover campaign costs. It was with spoils system that campaign finance became an issue in the United States. In particular, Congress enacted the Pendleton Civil Service Act (1883) determining meritocratic criteria to public employees selection process 20 . According to Corrado (2005) , the law restrained the influence of the spoils system in the selection of government workers by creating a class of federal employees who had to qualify for office through competitive examinations. It also prohibited the solicitation of political contributions from those employees, thus protecting them from forced campaign assessments (CORRADO, 2005: 9/10).
In 1904, judge Alton B. Parker, the Democratic presidential nominee, charged Theodore Roosevelt of exchanging political favors for campaign contributions (Corrado, 2005) . Parker also alleged that Roosevelt was blackmailing corporation monopolies to raise campaign contributions. According to Smith (2001) , more than 73% of all Republican general committee resources in 1904 were based on corporate contributions. Roosevelt denied all charges. However, a joint investigation of two different New York committees revealed that New York Life contributed with near to $ 48,000 for an non-registered account of the Republican National Party Committee in 1904 21 . Since 1890, Nebraska, Missouri, Tennessee and Florida banned corporate contributions to state elections, but after New York Life scandal public opinion demand more regulation. In 1907 Congress enacted Tillman Act.
In 1924, public demand for more regulation arose again after a scandal involving campaign contributions to incumbents candidates 20 Also in 1883 United Kingdom enacted the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act. Among its provisions, it made a crime to exchange votes for any economic benefit. In addition, the act imposed campaign spending limits. 21 In 1905 message to the Congress president Roosevelt stated that there is no enemy of free government more dangerous and none so insidious as the corruption of the electorate (...) I recommend the enactment of a law directed against bribery and corruption in Federal elections. in a non-electoral year. Congress passed new amendments to Federal Corrupt Practices Act (1910) , requiring that any contribution over $ 100,00 must be registered under party disclosure documents. In addition, it established new ceilings for spending for both House ($5,000) and senate elections ($25,000 Smith (2001) , it aimed to accomplish the following objectives: a) enforce disclosure provisions by adopting specific punishments for law break; b) increase the amount of resources available to public financing of presidential elections; c) establish ceilings on campaign spending, and d) decrease the general costs of elections. FECA (1971) assumed that the increasing costs of elections were direct associated with spending on media communications. In particular, the 1974 FECA amendments limited spending on media to no more than $100,000 or $.08 multiplied by the voting-age population of the state in a primary election and no more than $150,000 or $.12 multiplied by the state's voting-age population in a general election. However, before Congress enacts FECA general costs of 1968 were estimated around $ 300 million, compared to $425 million of 1972 elections 23 . In 1974 Congress enacted amendments to FECA (1971) establishing the most comprehensive regulatory package on campaign finance. Individual limits were defined to $1,000 and up tp $25,000 during electoral calendar year. PCAs contributions were also limited to $5,000. Among different institutional reforms, FECA 1974 amendments established the Federal Election Commission (Corrado, 2005 (CORRADO, 2005: 15) . 23 For example, president Richard Nixon spent more than twice in 1972 compared to 1968. Democrat George McGovern spent more than four times the total spent in 1968. 24 Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; of abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances (Amendment I, U.S. Constitution) is speech and therefore cannot be regulated, campaign contributions do not constitute a form of direct speech and thus could be regulated. The rationale to differentiate expenditures from campaign contributions was to prevent the corruption or appearance of corruption associated with large donations. (Buckley v. Valeo, 1976 Panorama of Brazilian Law. Vol 2, No 2 (2014) 
CONCLUSION
The principal aim of this paper was to analyze campaign finance in a comparative perspective, giving special attention to cases of Brazil and the United States. The results suggest that most countries show low levels of control over campaign contributions. However, both Brazil and the United States display higher levels of regulation on campaign finance sources, despite their widely different institutional designs. On institutional grounds, both Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) and Federal Election Commission (FEC) provide public open data regarding campaign finance and elections outcomes. Assuming that institutional change can benefit from information about other institutional contexts, it is important to understand how different countries regulate the role of money in politics. Comparative perspective allows evaluate which institutional practices seem to be more efficient and which ones are more likely to work on different institutional designs.
Undeniably, one of main challenges faced not only by scholars but also by policymakers is to properly estimate the effects of electoral rules. This is because any attempt of political reform should be informed by the effects of each institutional choice. This paper aims to advance our current knowledge on campaign finance regulation in general and in both Brazil and in the United States in particular. Law. Vol 2, No 2 (2014) 
